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SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT TO ENFORCE A
CORPORATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST DIRECTORS
UNDER SEC RULE lOb-5
Since 1946 when it was first held to provide a private right of action,
1
SEC Rule lOb-5 2 has developed into a widely used remedy for defrauded
sellers and purchasers of securities.3 Recovery has been allowed in a variety
of situations involving abuses of the securities trading process. It has made
no difference that the defrauded seller or purchaser has been a corpora-
tion.4 "[W]hen a corporation has a cause of action under the rule, a
stockholder may sue derivatively under the usual conditions." 5 There has,
however, been a reluctance to allow such a derivative corporate recovery
where the alleged fraud on the corporate seller or purchaser has been
committed by the directors of that corporation. This Comment will explore
the reasons for that reluctance and their validity.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission
in 1942 pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6
Basically, the rule outlaws fraudulent conduct in the interstate sale or pur-
chase of securities:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
of the mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or,
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
7
I Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 1763 & nn.260-61 (1961).
4 New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; Slavin
v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum) ; Kremer
v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (dictum); see McClure v.
Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
5 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1764; see cases cited id., n.264; New Park Mining
Co. v. Cranmer, vtpra note 4; Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963) ; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964).
648 Stat 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), quoted note 22 infra.
717 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1964).
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RULE 10b-5 ACTION AGAINST DIRECTORS
The difficulties faced by the federal courts in a lOb-5 derivative suit
by shareholders against directors alleged to have defrauded their corpora-
tion fall into two areas. A recovery under the rule requires a showing that
the victim was deceived in some way.8 The conceptual problem of finding
that the inanimate corporate entity can be deceived at all becomes especially
difficult when those who manage and act for the corporation are fully
aware of the situation, and are in fact responsible for it. The second, and
more serious, difficulty is the possible effect on our system of federalism
of federal court jurisdiction in these cases. The field of corporate man-
agement and the duty of directors to their corporations is primarily regu-
lated by state law. To superimpose federal law upon state created duties
might undermine the state's regulatory scheme-a result which would be
held undesirable by many people. Three recent cases put these issues in
perspective.
Barnett v. Anaconda Co.9 was a district court decision on a motion to
dismiss the complaint. Defendant Anaconda owned seventy-three percent
of the stock of a subsidiary, Wire and Cable. The complaint alleged that
directors of Anaconda, being a majority of the board of Wire and Cable,
transferred all the assets of the subsidiary to a new firm, totally controlled
by Anaconda, for a grossly insufficient amount of Anaconda stock. Despite
the Anaconda interests' control of the more than two-thirds of Wire and
Cable stock required for approval of the transaction, the plaintiff sought to
bottom his complaint on the issuance to other shareholders of a proxy
statement containing false and misleading statements. A minority share-
holder whose proxy was so solicited brought suit against Anaconda both
representatively, for the true value of shares held by the minority stock-
holders, and derivatively on behalf of Wire and Cable, to recover some
thirty-five million dollars by which defendant was unjustly enriched. The
court found that the transaction was "a sale of Anaconda stock to Wire
and Cable for all of Wire and Cable's assets," "I but dismissed the complaint
on the ground that any deception in the proxy statements could not have
been causative of the injury to either the individual plaintiffs or the sub-
sidiary corporation. This finding followed from the fact that the Anaconda
directors could have voted the amount of Wire and Cable stock necessary
to effectuate the transaction without the help of any minority stockholders
who might have been mislead by the proxy solicitation, "and no internal
corporate procedures under Delaware law were available to the minority
to block it." 11 The court assumed that plaintiff had "stated some claim
for relief under state law," 12 but said that the federal securities acts were
not meant to cover such cases of "'fraudulent mismanagement of corporate
affairs.' "13
8 E.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
9 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
bO Id. at 774.
,lId. at 776.
12 Id. at 769.
13 Id. at 775, quoting Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d
Cir.), cert. dended, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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In Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,'4 a derivative suit, plaintiff sought to
enjoin the directors of Roto American from issuing a block of the cor-
poration's stock. It was alleged that the defendant majority directors
had deceived the entire board into agreeing to the issuance of treasury
shares to be sold to the president or voted as he directed by withholding
pertinent financial data from the minority directors and by arbitrarily
ascribing a value of three dollars per share to the stock. The district
court refused to grant the injunction on the ground that this was a case of
fraudulent mismanagement by directors not covered by rule 10b-5.' 5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that cor-
porate issuance of securities is a sale under the rule and that this conduct,
fraud by a majority of the directors against the corporation, could con-
stitute a violation of the rule.
In O'Neill v. Maytag,16 decided by the same court, plaintiff brought
a derivative suit, alleging that the directors of National Airlines had given
up securities worth about thirteen million dollars belonging to the cor-
poration in exchange for National stock worth about eleven million dollars
in order to eliminate the threat which this National stock, in other hands,
posed to the directors' control of the corporation. Plaintiff's theory was
that payment of this almost two million dollar differential for personal
reasons was either a "scheme to defraud" the corporation, or an "act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud"
on the corporation "in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity." 17 The court of appeals, affirming the district court's dismissal,'
8
held that there can be no recovery under rule 10b-5 where there is no
allegation of deception, and that such cases of violation of general fiduciary
duties are not cognizable under the rule.
The situation presented in all three cases is one in which the directors
of a corporation engaged in a purchase or sale of securities on behalf of
the corporation which resulted in some kind of advantage to the directors,
or as in Barnett, to the parent corporation to which they owed their primary
loyalty, and a corresponding loss to the corporation. In each case the cor-
poration was the buyer or seller of securities.' 9 Redress under these cir-
cumstances must, of course, be by a derivative action. Since a corporate
management act was involved as well as a purchase or sale of securities,
the two difficulties of finding deception and satisfying the federal-state
allocation of powers are present.
14 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
IS Id. at 27. The district court order is unreported.
16 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
17 SEC Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 40.10b-5 (1964), quoted in full in text at note 7
.ritra.
1s230 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
19 The issuance of stock by the corporation in Ruckle was a sale of securities for
the purposes of rule lOb-5. See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d
195, 200-03 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); 65 CoLum. L. REv.
725 (1965).
RULE 10b-5 ACTION AGAINST DIRECTORS
The injured plaintiff who wishes to recover under rule 10b-5 must
show that he has been deceived. While it might seem that this require-
ment of deception is meaningless in the case of directors' misconduct
against their corporation, the contention that it need not be alleged in such
a situation was rejected in O'Neill v. Maytag.20 Plaintiff there argued
that the expressions "scheme to defraud" and "course of business which
operates or would operate to defraud" in the rule were broad enough to
comprehend the exchange at issue without an allegation of any particular
facts amounting to deception. This reliance on clauses (1) and (3) as
meaning some kind of fraud without deception is misplaced. The words
used in those subsections, "fraud," "defraud," and "deceit," have an ordi-
nary and historic meaning which encompasses deception.21 Furthermore,
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes the Commission
to prescribe rules to control only manipulative and deceptive devices and
contrivances. 22 Plaintiff did not argue that the exchange of stock for a
premium was in any way manipulative. If, on the other hand, he was
arguing that fraud under the rule could be found without either deception
or manipulation, then he was arguing that the rule went beyond the
SEC's statutory authority. No matter which of the three subsections is
relied upon, the complaint must allege some facts amounting to deception
in order to state a claim under the rule; the case of the defrauded cor-
poration is no exception to this requirement.
Where the fraudulent act is committed by an outsider, finding decep-
tion of the corporation is relatively easy. In that case, deception of the
directors, who act for the corporation, is deception of the injured corpora-
tion itself. The Ruckle court overcame the objection that a majority of
the board could not defraud the corporation by analogizing fraud cases to
those involving conflicts of interest and embezzlement where, the court said,
"a majority or even the entire board of directors may be held to have de-
frauded their [sic] corporation. When it is practical as well as just to do
so, courts have experienced no difficulty in rejecting such cliches as [sic]
the directors constitute the corporation and a corporation, like any other
person, cannot defraud itself." 2 A different line of reasoning was applied
in Barnett v. Anaconda Co.2 There the court held that when directors
have the naked power to carry out an act in the name of the corporation,
20339 F2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
21 The common legal meaning of these words is discussed in PRossmR, TORTS
§§ 100-01 (1964).
2248 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78j (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national security exchange . . . (b) to use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
23 Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1964).
24238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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and no internal corporate procedures exist to prevent it, any deception
used in pursuance of the act cannot be held causative of the injury.2
Ruckle was distinguished on the ground that there, but for the deception,
intracorporate means could have been used to stop the action by the
directors23
The use of conflict of interest and embezzlement analogies in Ruckle 27
to illustrate when directors are liable to the corporation is inappropriate.
Neither of those actions, even if it is assumed that they can generically
be termed "frauds," would require a showing that anyone had been de-
ceived. The Ruckle view of the deception element sidesteps the require-
ment of proving that the deception by the majority injured the corporation
by taking that fact for granted. But another reading of Ruckle does take
causation into account: that deception of a minority of the board is
causative of the corporate injury when, but for that deception, the
majority's transaction could have been prevented. Barnett adds a caveat
to this. In order for deception of a minority by a majority to be causative,
the transaction must have been preventable by "internal corporate pro-
cedures." 28 If the act by the majority could have been prevented, but for
the deception, only by extracorporate means such as a derivative suit,
then the deception will not be considered causative. The Barnett dis-
tinction seems unsupportable. It is probable that the reason the defendant
directors in Barnett tried to deceive the minority, whose votes they did
not need, was to keep them from contesting their acts, which the court
assumed to be illegal under state law.2 Since the plan could not have been
successful but for this ancillary deception of the minority shareholders,
that deception can be considered one of the causes in fact of the corporate
injury. There seems no rational basis for holding the cause any less real
in Barnett than in Ruckle merely because in the latter the fraudulent acts
could have been prevented by intracorporate means and resort to a deriva-
tive suit would not have been necessary.
A consideration of the structure of corporate power supports this
resolution of the threshold issue of causation. In the normal situation the
corporation is defrauded when its directors or managers are deceived. This
is because it is in that group that the corporate power to act and make
decisions resides.30 But there is one situation in which the corporate power
to act and make decisions shifts. When the board engages in actual mis-
conduct or merely refuses to seek a remedy for a wrong committed by a
third party, a shareholder is permitted to bring a suit on behalf of the
25Id. at 776.
2 61d. at 776 n.7: "[Pilaintiff [in Ruckle] represented a majority of the shares
and in all probability was deprived by the alleged deception of an opportunity to block
the transaction by appropriate corporate action."
27 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 8 Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; see note 26 supra
and accompanying text.
29238 F. Supp. at 769.
30 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 42 (1946).
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corporation. 1 The board then is no longer the focus of the corporate entity
for these purposes; the shareholder represents the effective decision making
power of the corporation. In the normal case, deceiving the managers is
deceiving the corporation, because such deception interferes with the
rational decision making processes by which corporate actions are taken.
When this decision making power shifts to even a minority of the stock-
holders, it should be sufficient that they have been deceived 3 2 and prevented
from making a decision which would protect the corporation. In Barnett,
minority shareholders were the only ones who would vindicate the rights
of the corporation in that situation; therefore the corporate identity was
theirs with reference to the particular injury. In Ruckle it was the
minority directors and a shareholder representing a majority of the stock
who were deceived. If these parties had the power to stop majority
action, by either intracorporate means or by a derivative suit, then the
management function was theirs for this purpose. Misleading them and
preventing them from exercising this function was deceiving the
corporation.33
The O'Neill plaintiff failed to develop the argument that the facts
could have been taken to show deception by an omission-that the directors
deceived the stockholders by concealing the fact that the exchange was
transacted for personal reasons and not for the corporate good, as their
silence would have led the shareholders to believe? 4 Had these share-
holders been aware of the true facts, they could have prevented the transac-
tion by a derivative suit in the state court, so the deception was causative
of the corporate injury. It has been suggested that rule lOb-5 was not
aimed at a deception such as this one involving improper motive, but only
at nondisclosure relating "essentially to factors bearing on investment
judgment, that is, the valuation of shares involved. . . ." 35 But it may
not always be clear which of these practices is present. Allowing a buyer
to think that a stock is worth x, when in fact it is worth x plus y, may
relate to both value and improper purpose. The heart of the matter is the
misuse of information pertaining to value, known to the director by reason
of his position and withheld from the minority. For instance, in Barnett
it was claimed that "audited balance sheets for relevant final periods of
Anaconda Wire and Cable were omitted from the proxy statement, earn-
ings and book value comparisons were distorted in favor of Anaconda and
other facts were distorted or omitted .... " 6 In other words, the
directors kept facts bearing on value from minority shareholders. In
O'Neill, on the other hand, there was no misuse of inside information. The
31 Id. § 145.
32 See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HAmv. L. REv.
1146, 1163-64 (1965).
33 See id. at 1164.
341d. at 1165.
35 Ibid.
36238 F. Supp. at 769.
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directors knew no more about the value of the securities than did the
minority. The minority shareholders were not foreclosed from finding
out the actual market value of the stock; they could simply have checked
the prices on the exchange to learn that something was amiss. In Barnett
and in Ruckle there was no independent source of information on value
available to the minority shareholders; they had to rely on the directors'
version of the facts. One of the central purposes of rule lOb-5 was to
prevent knowledgeable insiders from taking advantage of investors who
were at a bargaining disadvantage because the information that the insider
had was unavailable to them.37 The type of deception that is arguably
present in O'Neill is not of the type that Congress intended to deal with;
the deception in Ruckle and Barnett is.
The most frequently cited case for the proposition that rule lOb-5 will
not support a private action where the misconduct alleged in connection with
the sale or purchase of securities is a form of corporate mismanagement is
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.3 s In that case the president and con-
trolling stockholder of Newport passed up a merger which would have
been beneficial to the minority and instead sold his stock at a premium
to another company. The court, in denying relief to the plaintiff, suing
derivatively held that section 10(b) "was directed solely at that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale
or purchase of securities rather than at the fraudulent mismanagement
of corporate affairs . . . . " 9 It is apparent that in Birnbaum, unlike
the three cases here discussed, the corporation was not a party to the
transaction, and the case can certainly be distinguished on that basis.40
But the objection to which it gives voice is more fundamental.
At this point it will be helpful to distinguish betwen two possible
lOb-5 situations involving corporate directors. In the more common case
the insider holding stock in the corporation is charged with buying it from
or selling it to an outsider, withholding or misrepresenting facts pertinent
to the value of the security which he knows by virtue of his corporate
position.4 ' He acts in an individual capacity and not for the corporation.
In such cases, where an instrumentality of interstate commerce was em-
37 See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951);
cf. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961).
38 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
39 Id. at 464.
40 [T]here can be nothing to preclude resort to Rule 10b-5 as the basis of a
shareholder's derivative action complaining that the corporation sold shares
to dominating insiders at a wrongfully low price or . . .bought shares from
them at a wrongfully high price. Since the gist of such a complaint would
be injury to the corporation as buyer or seller and there would be no question
about the corporation's "privity," the dictum in Birnbaum that Rule 10b-5
was not intended to redress the fraudulent management of corporate affairs
seems irrelevant in such a context.
Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1770-71; see Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 834-35 (1956).
41 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass.
1962), vmodified, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965).
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ployed by the defendant, the federal courts have allowed private recoveries
and used rule lOb-5 as the basis for a federal standard of disclosure.42
While the states do have policies against fraudulent sales and purchases
of securities, the interstate nature of the transactions provided Congress
with the power to regulate them and the federal courts with power to
effectuate that congressional policy by allowing private recoveries. 43  The
second group of cases includes those like Ruckle, Barnett and O'Neill. In
these cases the directors were acting in a corporate capacity and were
making management decisions in the course of the transaction. If the
transaction were fraudulent and employed interstate instrumentalities, cer-
tainly the federal interest was no less present than in the former class of
case. But a significant problem arises here: corporate management has
traditionally been a subject for state, not federal regulation. If a federal
law of corporate management supersedes state law on that subject, as the
federal law on disclosure in interstate securities transactions between an
insider and the person he deals with has preempted state control of such
relations, the result could be a substantial disruption of the state's policy,
not to speak of the difficulties that would be created for insiders ruled
by two possibly conflicting standards of conduct.
The problem, however, is not so insoluble as these considerations
might seem to indicate. There is a way to allow the federal interest in
preventing interstate stock frauds to operate with no corresponding dis-
ruption of state policy. This approach involves viewing the element of
causation as a question of state law. Section 10(b), as implemented by
rule lOb-5, reflects a congressional policy decision that the interstate sale
and purchase of securities is to be free from fraud. The rule is designed
to protect all "persons" which, as the legislation makes clear, includes
corporations.44  This is a federal right to be free from a particular kind
of misconduct. One of the chief purposes of federal question jurisdiction
is the vindication of federal rights.45  Since the same right has already
been granted federal court protection where a director acts in his private
capacity, there is little reason for denying such protection to the corporate
victim when he has acted in his managerial capacity. 46 The case belongs
42 See Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, 1450-74; Note, Purchaser's Duty To Disclose
Under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-1OB-5, 40 MINN. L. REv. 62
(1955).
43 See the discussion in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514
(E.D. Pa. 1946), inferring this particular remedy from the general legislative and
regulatory scheme. It is surprising that the Kardon; court and those that followed
it never considered the question of federal question jurisdiction. There seems to have
been some doubt, at least before Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1956), whether such a private suit, not provided for in the legislation, arises under
federal law. See also Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUm. L. Rav. 157, 195-96 (1953).
4448 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9) (1964).
45 See Mishkin, supra note 43, at 159.
46 In this regard see two fairly recent cases from the Southern District of New
York which would seem to support this position. In New Park Mining Co. v.
Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the court said:
It is immaterial whether the purchase or sale was part of a larger scheme of
corporate mismanagement if the elements of a claim under Section 10(b) and
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in a federal forum and federal law should regulate the theory of the action.
This does not mean, however, that in determining whether the misconduct
falls under the rule, recognition cannot be given to state policy. Federal
law can fix the outer limits of proscribed conduct with reference to the
congressional regulatory scheme. 47 This will meet the objective of giving
a federal remedy for violation of a federal right. But state law governing
corporate management will determine whether a deception, within these
outer limits, was causative of the injury. The deception must be causa-
tive in order to give rise to a claim. To be causative of the injury it must
have been preventable; if plaintiff could not have prevented the transaction
even if he were aware of all the facts, the test has not been met. Whether
the transaction was preventable will be a question to which the federal
courts will look to state law; the state has the primary interest in what
directors should or should not be allowed to do vis-i-vis the corporation.
The delicate balance of corporate power which the state has established,
and which will govern the corporation in most cases anyway, must be
respected.
The idea of federal courts using a state standard in federal question
cases is not novel.48 Nor should there be a fear of federal courts' applying
state law incorrectly; they are regularly called upon to apply state law in
diversity situations.4 9 The result will be that violation of a state law on
Rule lob-5 are otherwise present . . . Were this not the rule, corporate
officers and directors would possess an immunity from the consequences of
their fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 which outsiders who may
have collaborated with them in defrauding the corporation would not possess
Id. at 266.
The court in Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
put it somewhat differently:
It is of course true that irrespective of the broad language of Rule 10
(b)-5, the courts have been disinclined to allow "innumerable facets of internal
corporate affairs" to be included within federal question jurisdiction on the
basis of a purchase or sale of securities that is only incidental to a major
mismanagement issue. On the other hand, that the fraud was perpetrated by
insiders does not render Section 10(b) inapplicable, if the transaction repre-
sents an abuse of the securities trading process, and should properly be sub-
ject to SEC regulations for an adequate remedy.
Id. at 25.
See Leech, supra note 40, at 834-35; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
434 (1964):
[W]e believe that the overriding federal laws applicable here would, where
the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress despite the provisions
of state corporation law, for it "is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion
federal law where federal rights are concerned." . . . In addition, the fact
that questions of state law must be decided does not change the character of
the right; it remains federal ...
47A case like O'Neill might not be actionable under rule lOb-5 even if there
were a violation of state law, because the deception there does not seem to be of the
kind which the regulation prohibits. See notes 34-37 .-upra and accompanying text.
4 8 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) ; see Mishkin, The Variousness
of Federal Law: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
49 Indeed, if this type of case is held not to arise under any federal law, the federal
courts will probably still be called upon to adjudicate many controversies of this type,
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fiduciary duties which is relevant to the purposes of the federal regulatory
scheme will give rise to a federal cause of action.50
Certain unique problems, then, arise in a derivative action against
corporate directors which are absent in other circumstances where rule
lOb-5 comes into play. The requirement of deception cannot be dispensed
with in such a case, nor can the need to show that the deception was
causative of the corporate injury. But the concept of causation must be
considered with reference to the actualities of the corporate power struc-
ture, and it should suffice that those who are entitled to wield the corporate
decision making power over a given transaction be deceived. The kind
of deception that should be required to state a claim under the rule is that
which involves misuse of inside information pertaining to the value of the
securities, which is what Congress intended to prevent. The danger of
disruption of state policies on corporate management by federal court
intrusion into this area can be minimized by viewing a violation of state
law on fiduciary duties as an element of the federal cause of action. This
will allow the federal courts to oversee the vindication of federal rights
while respecting state rules on a subject where state interests are primary.
using state law as the standard. The benefits of federal procedures governing deriva-
tive suits will often motivate claimants to try to establish diverse citizenship. For
some of these advantages, see Lowenfels, Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative
Action, 18 VAND. L. REv. 893, 898-908 (1965).
50 The problem of the relation of fiduciary duties to the purposes of the act was
brought to the attention of the House of Representatives. See House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Securities Exchange Bill of 1934, H.R. RE. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7701 (1934) :
The causes of dangerous speculation in the securities markets go far deeper
than defects and abuses in stock-market machinery alone. . . . They include
inadequate corporate reporting which keeps in ignorance of necessary factors
for intelligent judgment of the values of securities a public continually so-
licited to buy such securities by the sheer advertising value of listing. They
include exploitation of that ignorance by self-perpetuating managements in
possession of inside information. Speculation, manipulation, faulty credit
control, investors' ignorance, and disregard of trust relationships by those
whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, all are a single seamless web.
No one of these evils can be isolated for cure of itself alone.
Id. at 7703.
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